The United Nations' Security Council
The Question of Reform

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More than half a century behind its foundation the United Nations has been suffering several demands for the restructuring of the Security Council, since the present Permanent Membership, made up of Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States is seen as an historical misdate and a mere 'shopwindow' of the victorious powers of the Second World War, no longer reflecting today's international order and the United Nations as an institution. Considering the various voices for the reform of the Security Council, several authors have numbered possible ways in which the Council might be reformed. These possible changes will be deeply analyzed in this essay, always taking into account today's international order and in which ways this order can influence the outcome of such complex metamorphosis.

More than fifty years after its 'birth' the United Nations is suffering enormous pressures to reform the Security Council, since the present status of the permanent membership no longer reflects today's international order and the United Nations' structure as an organization. To reform the Security Council the most common approach involves the re-arranging of the Council's composition and the powers of its members.

In order to understand the actual status and the complex situation of the UN and the Security Council today, we have to go back to the beginning of this century, when a new system of diplomacy and 'international relations' was introduced into the life of nations. This new order was established due to the occurrence of a catastrophic 'great war' which led to the creation of the first real 'experience' of an universal organization- The League of Nations. The League and mainly its Council, and the reasons for their failure, can be seen as fundamental for a better understanding of the contemporary 'middle-age' crises of the United Nations.

However, the aim of this essay is not analyse the so-called middle-age crises of the UN, but the various ways in which the Security Council can be reformed in order to make the United Nations a more democratic and effective organization. The possible changes will bestudied taking into account today's international order and in which way this order can influence the outcome of such a complex metamorphosis. Contemporary third world state theories of integration within the UN's structure and recent diplomatic actions from the Member States will be treated as essential in the following article.

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Possible Changes in the Veto Power

The veto power is the guarantor of a certain balance within the security Council. It ensures that no decisions can be taken against the will of permanent members. However, this power has raised voices of great criticism since the UN's and the Security Council's early days. The major critic is based in the fact that it can block the Council's procedures and delay decisions. Hence, when the veto is used by any of the five permanent members it will immediately jeopardise a possible resolution.

Therefore, in order to improve the effectiveness of the Council, one of the possible measures would be the eradication of the veto. This measure is only possible with an amendment to the Charter. For such an amendment to be possible the full support by the P5 (five permanent members) is required. Having the power of the veto is a question of privilege and a synonymous of strength, consequently all permanent member States will have no interest in giving up this exclusive right.

The right to veto of each permanent member is considered as one of the main obstacles in the achievement of a Council's reform. When more than fifty years ago the drafters of the UN Charter stated that the elected five permanent members were to be the maintainers of peace and responsible for a better equilibrium within the international society, as the winners of World War II, they were assuming the importance of these countries (China, France, United Kingdom, United States of America and the Soviet Union) in the future maintenance of the organization. However, during the last few years, the veto has been seen more as a blocking instrument then a guarantor of balance within the Security Council, and a measure of control over the several operations that the UN engages in.

On the other hand, the maintenance of the veto has numerous advantages: it is considered as being the condensing element of the Security Council, playing a vital role in all the UN operations. The Council is where all the main issues (war and peace) are debated and decided; abolishing the veto would increase the difficulty in the decision-making process in various demands and it would build a gap between the major powers and the Organization.

In a way, the removal of the veto would accelerate and improve the procedure of the Council. Although its abolishment, at the same time, would break the Security Council apart. Hence, it is in the interest of the Organization and of the permanent members to maintain the veto to ensure the stability of the UN and the demands of the P5. However, having in mind the year 2005, a reforming plan concerning the membership of the Council and the veto is on the way to be enforced, taking into account the actual international scenario and the growing strength of regional bodies[1].

Another possible change to the present veto status is the extension of this right to new permanent members, more permanent members and consequently more vetoes. The extension of the Security Council is a fair and desirable task, yet the prolongation of this right to new permanent states will immediately stall both the security Council's

and UN's actions. According to the Commission on Global Governance, "the actual situation of the Security Council is unacceptable. However, adding more permanent members and giving them the power of veto would be regressive"[2].

The introduction of new permanent members without veto would create a third membership category within the Security Council. It would confuse things even more and do nothing to ensure the prime objectives of reform, fairer representation and more efficiency decision making[3]. This change would implement a two-tier structure of permanent membership, where the existing permanent members would retain the use of the veto while the second group would remain without this privilege. The main problem of this proposal comes from the fact that it would stress even more the North/South differences, creating a new hierarchy of states among the UN members.

The 'old reality' of permanent and non-permanent membership exists for more than fifty years, being created according to the political reality of the time, the end of the War and the beginning of a new international order. Yet, the creation of a new hierarchy based on two different permanent statutes, with and without veto, would increase substantially the existing anomalies concerning permanent membership.

The actual status of France and UK, no longer the great powers of the past, have been seriously questioned by the several aspirants to permanent seats, mainly Japan and Germany, to whom the Security Council no longer reflects the actual international reality. This issue is one of the greatest dilemmas of the Security Council[4]. However, and according to Freitas do Amaral, the former President of the UN's General Assembly: "The possibility of the aspirants to a permanent seat becoming members without veto would not be a barrier to the consolidation of the Council's reform. Various states have already expressed their will of becoming permanent members, even without such an exclusive right"[5].

A different proposal for reform is the establishment of a rule where the veto would only apply if two permanent members will agree to exercise it. This change would be a very constructive proposal, yet it will only be possible with the approval of the present super powers.

Today's international environment shows an apparent unity and complicity between the western states, however the actual stability can suddenly be transformed into a 'western breakdown', where the United States can, in a rush, be relegated to isolationism. There is no doubt about the genuineness of this measure, which would bring more democracy and effectiveness to the Security Council. Yet it would be a controversial measure as we will never know the political and strategic situation of the globe within the next decades.

Taking into account the enlargement of the actual Security Council and avoiding the consequent increase of vetoes, which is seen by several UN members as a negative result, one solution might be the introduction of a 'combined vote/veto'. This measure would balance the regional representation within the Council. Therefore, it would not

only give a chance to other States of becoming permanent members; it would also give 'a voice' to all member States, thus a 'combined vote/veto' would require several negative votes by permanent members to veto a Security Council decision. This change will also avoid the possible total elimination of the veto creating another possible solution for the 'great veto dilemma'.

Again, it will be very unlikely the allowance by the actual P5 of such a reform as it will diminish the power of their veto and consequently their status within the Council. According to Carlos Santos, a combined vote/veto would also have some negative effects within the Security Council: it would create divisions among the members and at the same time would be a barrier in the achievement a Global consensus[6].

This solution will be deeply analysed later, when the addition of new permanent members will be discussed. For now, the most important and possible veto changes have been discussed above in various ways. However, it will be important to emphasize that, whatever the changes, the present P5 and the future members should enjoy the same status and privileges and should assume the responsibilities taken upon membership.

The Addition of New Permanent Members

Taking into account the present will of making the Security Council more regionally representative, it might be time now for a coalition of middle powers, not themselves aspirants to a permanent membership, to propose solutions.

The addition of new permanent members, one, two or three, is considered as the most consensual form of enlargement, because a larger increase would jeopardise its effectiveness. The reform in the security council can not be avoided, however the change must be smooth and gradual maintaining its efficiency and unity. The actual status of the permanent membership should be maintained, avoiding at the same time a total transformation which could bring division and the consequent collapse of the Council.

The enlargement would bring a more genuine representation of all the UN members, therefore a limited expansion of the number of permanent seats, paying regard to an equitable geographical participation, would be profitable for the health of the organization. The consequent increase in the membership of the United Nations, since the beginning of the 80's[7], justifies the consequent enlargement of the Security Council, where the principal criterion continues to be the effectiveness and legitimacy of this body. The expansion of the Council should be accomplished on a consensus and a common goal of all the UN members, including the various regional groups. The selection of new permanent members should exclude any type of predetermination, excluding non-aligned countries and other developing countries without the strength of the present P5.

A very important aspect derives from the fact that the P5 are meant to act on behalf of the general UN membership, unless its actions are based on the widest possible support,

its resolutions will never be globally respected nor effective.

The election criteria for new permanent members should be based on various factors, including strength and responsibility. Countries, including Brazil, India, Japan, Nigeria and Germany have already expressed their will of becoming permanent members on the basis of a Security Council expansion, however a consensus would still have to be achieved in order to choose, by virtue of their global interest and their contribution to international peace and security operations, the more capable states. This extension should be allocated only to a limited number of seats avoiding any unrealistic and less appropriate future composition of one of the most important of the UN Council's, while the new candidates to permanent seats should have the capacity and political will to assume fully the global responsibilities that come together with such status, with regard to the maintenance of a global order.

One of the most important international issues occurred since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, was the emergence of two major economic powers, Japan and Germany. They have been diminished from the membership of the P5 since the establishment of the organization due to the fact of being the losers of the second World War, yet their power and influence makes the latter reason no longer significant. They should join the Security council as permanent members[8]. Japan has been consequently seen as the greatest case for a permanent seat due to its political and economic power, which is reflected in its financial contributions to the organization budgets, the second biggest contributor with 12,5% right after the United States with the major sum of 25%.

However, Germany is also a great contributor (9%) and the actual major European power, both economically and politically, which complicates to a certain extent the deserved Japanese aspiration of becoming a permanent member itself.

This permanent category should not be exclusive of great economical and military powers connected with the West, where by adding one or two more permanent members to balance the financial obligations of some veto-wielding powers would not be enough. The reform of the Security Council must represent more than a merely expansion for some industrialized states and a piecemeal enlargement of the permanent member's category, it must represent an equitable and fair geographical representation. Yet, the potential selection of new permanent seats already contradicts this latter principle, which is considered by the generality of the members as crucial. A Council's reform in which three great European states, France, Britain and probably Germany, would keep a permanent seat would go against all the above stated principles of an equitable regional representation on the 'Exclusive Club'.

There are various candidates to a permanent status, some of them from Africa, for example Nigeria, others from Latin America and Caribbean (Brazil) and others from developing countries in Asia, where the most probable is India[9]. These candidates together with the two so-called 'powerful' candidates, Germany and Japan, have been seen as the strongest claims to the possible available permanent seats. Yet, the non-

aligned and other developing countries make up a majority of the UN's membership. For a fair and equitable representation of the demands and interests of these countries in the resolution of major international issues, the developing countries should, on all accounts, become permanent members of the UN's Security Council.

According to Denmark and Tanzania[10], permanent status should be granted to two countries in Africa, two countries in Latin America and Caribbean, and two developing countries in Asia. A present arrangement where Africa and Latin America regions are not represented at all amongst the veto-holding permanent members should not be allowed to continue. However, this full regional enlargement would consequently require a significant expansion of the organ, this expansion would increase the number of vetoes which would probably stall the work of the Council and raise voices of criticism against the reform. In order to solve this situation the right of the veto should not be granted to any permanent member, thus with the end of the Cold War the veto no longer has any justification to exist, this idea is strongly supported by countries such as Malaysia and Libya[11].

Admitting that Germany and Japan could be future permanent members, this will undoubtedly increase the influence of the 'North', being necessary to compensate the addition of some 'Southern' states mainly large regional powers like those stated previously, Brazil, India and Nigeria. However, this would provoke criticism from those countries neighbours. For example, how would Algeria feel represented by Nigeria? And Pakistan by India? Or Argentina by Brazil? The biggest countries within the Southern regions cannot easily represent the interests of their neighbours[12]. The 'South' due to political, social and economic problems lives under a climate of great instability and suspicion, they all need a voice in the international arena in order to change their status of less influent and less supported. To gain a representation in one the most important organs within the UN, they must unite themselves and choose a 'regional power' to defend their interests and support their opinions in the Council, otherwise they will fail to see their 'side' represented[13].

There are various views on the need to elaborate criteria for new permanent members. Some questioned the need for an elaboration of criteria since this was a matter for political negotiation and decision. Others suggest a criteria based on the actual article 23 (1) of the Charter, applicable at present only to the selection of non-permanent members: "...The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to non-permanent members of the Security Council... to the contribution of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security... and also to equitable geographic distribution"[14]. This formula would guarantee the continuous presence in the Council of the current permanent members, and at the same time a more frequent presence for twenty of thirty mid to large-size countries. Moreover, the larger number of members would make it easier to redress the present geographic imbalance in the Council.

The majority of states support this method of global selection, which is considered a more practical alternative because it would be quite difficult for regional groups to reach an agreement on the selection of regional representatives. The proponents of

regional selection, on the other hand, believe that the regional approach was more appropriate and that regional groups should have the primary responsibility in selecting their representatives on the Council.

The Redistribution of the Existing Permanent Seats

Within the new international order, it is hard to imagine that the new aspirants to a permanent seat would accept the office without the same powers of the actual P5. With the end of the Cold War and the apparent development of the losers of the second world war, the old hierarchy is no longer suitable with the contemporary international society. Thus the inclusion of the new 'powers' within the Security Council is no longer a doubt, yet it still has to be defined the criteria of organization, thus by extension or by substitution. The obvious permanent members that can be removed from the Security Council are France and Britain, their position within the organ has suffered great pressures during the last few years, not only with the strong challenge from Germany and Japan but with pressures coming from other UN members claiming their equal right of being members of such a 'club'.

However, the great dilemma derives from the replacement of these two countries, who should replace them? In terms of economical and political influence, Japan and Germany would be the obvious substitutes. Yet their past as the losers of the Second World War together with the intransigence of France and Britain for giving up their permanent seats, are considered major obstacles for the achievement of a solution.

If the European Union would agree to a rotating membership it would be easier to solve such a complex dilemma. Yet, this is very unlikely to happen, thus the UN is constituted of sovereign states and not of individual organizations. The actual status of France and Britain can also be considered as a barrier in the achievement of a fair redistribution within the Security Council. They are no longer the great powers of the past, and if there was fairness, Britain and France should give up their seats, which derive from their old colonial status rather than their actual power. However, how likely that these two European 'giants' would cede their historical status as members of the so-called exclusive club and trust their interests to an European Union representative or to other major European state like Germany, while Japan would take the other vacant place[15].

Yet, this solution shares great consensus between various UN members and it is actually considered the most probable to be implemented. It would reform the council without taking the serious risk of making the Council less effective, thus with the non-extension of the number of permanent members there was no consequent increase in the number of vetoes. While in recent years the permanent members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, it is also true that nothing guaranties that this tendency will continue and become irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto can have a strong impact on the Council's proceedings and the final outcome of its debates.

The major obstacle derives from the veto fact, France and Britain as members of the P5 have veto, and they would never vote themselves out of the top table. They seem to be open to a more representative circle of permanent members within the Security Council in order to include states like Japan, Germany and some regional powers from the South. Yet, they will not support any solution which can weaken their influence and strength within the Council and the United Nations itself.

The holders of the right to veto may use the 'veto anti-veto', however a good solution consists in maintaining the actual number of permanent members, replacing France and Great Britain by Japan and the European Union. Germany, the outsider, could agree to the fact, but only under the EU's single voice. France would reflect upon this issue. Great Britain has strongly opposed to the EU's solidarity towards the UN for a long time. The EU's search for common foreign policies cannot simply be confined to Maastricht Treaty, and attributing Western Europe a single seat in the Security Council would bring it a relevant position. The EU being incapable of assuming this purpose, Germany, France and Great Britain should take this single seat in turns. Clarifying European's stand, and allowing Japan's entry into Security Council, would not solve all the problems. Despite all, the developing world would still be feeling unjustly treated, and would be considering the Security Council a club for the rich.

The removal of Britain and France and the consequent inclusion of Japan and an European seat, would unbalance the Council even more, thus the membership of the Council would be fully 'Northern' with six of the seven members of the G7 (the seven most industrialized nations) being represented in the Security Council. This situation would go against all principles of a more equitable representation within the organ and it would raise voices of great criticism from various developing countries like Indonesia and Chile[16], to whom the geographical balance is essential for the development of the Organization.

The Northern powers rejoice, the revised Council is able, they say, to maintain peace in a modernist way[17]. This is argued against by Southern nations, being that the Council is closed and sympathetic towards neo-imperialists. This is a powerful controversy. If United Nations loses credit, the Security Council would still oversee governments, but it would lose international legitimacy and its predetermined order will not have the necessary strength to intimidate the major powers. Yet, if the United Nations is the voice of the world, the Security Council must be more than a Western exclusive group. It would be a pity if the United Nations' Security Council, free from the East-West confrontation, is trapped in a North-South opposition. It could be the case.

This scenario cannot continue. Japan made clear that it wanted admission into the 'major league' at the UN's 50th anniversary, in 1995. Germany made clear, with less emphasis, that it would not be in the background[18]. The developing world, unsatisfied with Japan's representative delegate, upholds its claim insistently. If the system is working, let us keep it that way, believers say when referring to the status quo. It is a strong argument.

All the changes concerning the Security Council require the review of the UN's Charter

by the General Assembly. But the countries that can veto may prevent it. Thus, there is a gap between what must be done and what can be done. The solution that seems to have the approval of the five permanent members is the one of Japan's discreet entry, because money is necessary. Second only to that of the USA, the financial contribution from Japan to peace maintenance is substantial. But if Japan enters the scenario, Germany will refuse to continue to be an outsider. And Russia may be the problem, due to having the heritage of the Soviet Union, has not the financial capacity, the military and authoritarian power to be the centre of Western Europe.

The UN has no money. Germany and Japan are the richer countries in the economic order. Russia cannot pay. The US has no hurry in paying. Japan and Germany may and should pay. This is Bill Clinton's logic. Being the first President of the baby boom generation, who never had Germany or Japan for enemies, he wonders why should these two countries be excluded from the most reserved club in the world. During his first election campaign, Bill Clinton said that he wanted to be the president of the USA, but not in the style of George Bush, who was applying to be the world's 'guardian'. Now, that Bill Clinton understood that all the World's problems ended up at the Oval Office, he needs the help of his allies who can play the American game.

Despite the good old loyal services in the Gulf, the British and the French are not the most important allies. They cannot hold their share with USA, and their reduced defence budgets do not allow them the capacity of deployment and combat that the Americans would require. The Balkan disaster proves that, despite all the nuclear weapons and all their highly expensive military pretensions, London and Paris probably are not the best allies to defend USA's interests in Europe. As in the 40's, when Great Britain and France were incapable of defending Western Europe, the best American solution is to include Germany in the group of 'best allies'.

Germany and Japan, although will make the Security Council even more unbalanced, they are considered fundamental to the survival of the organization, at least in financial terms[19].

Conclusion

A reform within the Security Council will create various divisions and clashes both in the actual P5 and the non-permanent seats. The Security Council still is an anachronism, if the five permanent members have the right of veto, the winners of the World War II, the other 10 members are elected for a two year period. USA, UK and France dominate the decisions. Russia is no longer a threat and China is absorbed by its internal affairs. The possible admission of two more 'Northern' countries, Japan and Germany, will not only raise deserved voices of disagreement from the South, it will make the Council definitely more unbalanced and geographically unfair.

Despite this, countries such as India, Nigeria (or eventually Egypt) and Brazil are still aspirants to permanent member status, according to their size and/or geographical position. It seems to be a lasting wait. Some countries believe that their entry into the

Security Council would make the club unmanageable. (This became polemic in the 60's when the number of members changed from 11 to 15). The right to veto is the real problem. The veto power has not been exercised very frequently, but its performance has already revealed a failure. In the past, the Soviet Union appealed to block the plans of capitalist countries, and the US put to use the right to veto to protect Israel, as it happen a year ago when the US veto twice, measures against Israel concerning the increasing of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. Yet, these actions are now less frequent due to the end of the Cold War, and since Israel ensures its protection by lecturing peace conferences.

Abolishing the right to veto would be wiser, if a two-third majority could approve all decisions. This assertion is a fictional one because the owners of the right to veto would veto on this decision. By common agreement, veto has no use at present, but it is necessary to bring up an equivalent right to shield them against a possible conflict of views with small countries, which would force the major powers into something against their will.

The existence of a third group is frequently discussed: one of the permanent members without the right of veto. This group could operate, but would not contribute to ease the resentment that is in the basis of the Security Council's difficulties: if a country deserves a seat as a permanent member, why should it not have the right to veto? There is a simple reason: the very same country could put to use the right to veto, and the Council would be again in the same dilemma it had to go through in the past. On the other hand, a radical change happened since then: the Council is ready to reconsider the UN's traditional point of view; that is, the governments have a sovereign right to be cruel against their citizens.

Several countries resent this new way of intervention, in particular those countries who are developing, and representative members for the Third World might feel tempted to block this right. It is a risk; but the loss of credit by the UN is also a risk. The situation is suitable to those countries of the South, but the rest of the world cannot be excluded indefinitely from the leading world representative for peace keeping. It would be preferable to welcome the newcomers and to hold them responsible, instead of giving mistrust credit.

Views differed as to whether possible new permanent members should be granted the right of veto. Those who supported the granting of the veto to new permanent members argue against the creation of a new category of second-class permanent members. In this respect, they pointed out that equal treatment for current and new permanent members was an important principle. Some states, like Sudan and Surinam[20], argued that since all permanent members would have the same obligations, they, particularly, those which were developing countries should be entitled to the same privileges. However, national governments do not always assess possibilities for a reform of the Council with a sceptical eye on the costs, the loss of national power, prestige and consequently influence[21].

Moreover, some delegations argued that the present imbalance in the Security Council would only be partially redressed if new permanent members were denied the right of veto. Delegations, such as Latvia, who opposed granting the veto to new permanent members regarded any such extension as furthering an inherently undemocratic privilege which should actually be restricted and probably abolished in a post Cold War era[22].

The general assumption within the Council is against the extension of the veto, thus any extension of this exclusive right would be contrary to the principle of equality of states and the spirit of co-operation in the collective security system. Opponents of such an extension also feared that it could prove detrimental to the Security Council's efficiency and effectiveness and could reinforce prevailing regional imbalances.

Within the actual Security Council and mainly in the P5 there are various opinions to be considered. For example, United States considers the introduction of Japan in the new group of permanent members as essential and very positive, due to its economic and financial contributions to the UN budget and to its generally recognised political influence. However, Japan as an internal clause that can constitute a barrier for its full admission in the Council. The Japanese constitution restriction of sending forces abroad, due the behaviour during the Second World War, would create a security dilemma within the Council. Thus the main purpose of this organ is the maintenance of peace and security.

France and Britain both agree in the enlargement of the Security Council, yet according to them the expansion will only be successful if the organ continues in a lasting way to be representative of the community of nations throughout a reasonable increase in the number of members. According to them the admission of Japan and Germany is welcome, together with some states of the developing world, taking always into account the natural and desirable enlargement of the non-permanent membership. This two major European states have no doubts about the necessity of a reform, however they will not let their power fade away with any redistribution in the Council. France and Britain have veto power, they do not want to lose this exclusive right, nor vote themselves out of the P5[23].

Other possible reform which is already creating some divisions between the UN Members is the immediate re-election of non-permanent members which would restrict the representation of remaining candidates for non-permanent seats, reducing the number of regional seats available for them. This argument is based on the lack of uniformity in the way UN regional groups selected candidates for non-permanent membership. In this connection, with reference to the system of rotation used by the African group in contrast with the practice of other groups, it was suggested that the selection procedures of the different UN groups could be unified to ensure equality of treatment across regions. The new proposal would be put forward with the intent effect of regularizing the current practice of selecting some states regularly for non-permanent membership of the Council. This envisaged a formula by which certain agreed named

states would be selected to additional permanent seats on the Council on a more frequent basis than others.

Views were expressed, like with other proposals, both in support of, and against, lifting the ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members. It is just another complexity to be solved, while in the meantime the process of reform should be quickly completed, the UN cannot wait any longer.

According to the Independent Commission on the future of the United Nations, another problem of the Security Council accountability and representative might be to avoid the 'diplomatic' difficult task of redesigning the Council[24]. Instead, a new body, an executive council, could be created which would take on some of the security Council's responsibilities and acquire more powers over time as the Council's anachronistic structure render it more and more obsolete. Such an executive Council might even be composed by individuals elected by the most represented organ within the UN, the General Assembly.

The challenge is made. Now, more than fifty years after the foundation of the old boys club it is up to the international society and mainly to the members of the United Nations to decide between reform or die.

NOTAS

1 Cf. The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995. p. 344.
2 Op. cit., p. 345.
3 Cf. Whittaker, D. J., *United Nations in action*. UCL Press: London, 1995. p. 18.
4 Ibid., p. 17.
5 In Amaral, D. F., Carta das Nações Unidas. *Revista Vida - Jornal Independente*, Nov 1995, p. 9.
6 Cf. Santos, C., A restauração dos órgãos das Nações Unidas para enfrentar novos desafios. *Nação e Defesa*, Abril-Junho 1995, p. 53.
7 Cf. *Newsweek Magazine* (October 30, 1995). Prizes and Parking Tickets, p. 37.
8 Cf. Roberts, A. & Kingsbury, B., *Presiding over a divided world: Changing the UN rules, 1945-1993, Chap. 9*, London, 1994, p. 52.
9 Cf. The Commission on Global Governance, op. cit., p. 345.
10 Cf. Huber, F., *Summary of Statements at the General Debate of the 50th Session of the General Assembly concerning the reform of the Security Council*. UN: New York, 1995. p. 2-7.
11 Ibid., p. 6.
12 Cf. Kennedy, P. & Russet, B., Reforming the United Nations. *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 1995, p. 61.
13 Ibid.
14 In Evans, M. D., *Charter of the United Nations, Article 23 (1)*. (International Law Documents). Blackstone Press: London, 1991. p. 12.
15 Cf. Kennedy, P. & Russet, B., op. cit., p.61.
16 Cf. Huber, F., op. cit., p. 2-3.

17 Cf. Wagner, W., Le siège permanent au Conseil de Sécurité. Qui a besoin de qui: Les Allemands du siège? Ou le Conseil de Sécurité des Allemands? *Politique Etrangère*, Hiver 93/94, p. 1001.
18 Ibid., p. 1003.
19 Ibid.
20 Cf. Huber, F., op. cit., p. 9.
21 Cf. Independent Commission on the Future of the United Nations, *Towards Common Goals, Conference Report*, April 1993, p. 22.
22 Cf. Huber, F., op. cit., p. 5.
23 Cf. Kennedy, P. and Russet B., op. cit., p.61.
24 Cf. Independent Commission on the Future of the United Nations, op. cit., p. 24.

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Martins, Miguel Roque - 聯合國安理會改革問題。

自從聯合國成立後的半個多世紀以來，有關改組安理會的要求接連不斷，因為目前由英國、中國、法國、俄羅斯及美國組成的常任理事國被看成是一個歷史的錯誤，僅僅是第二次世界大戰戰勝國的"櫥窗"，不再反映今天的國際秩序和聯合國作為一種機構的這種狀況。鑒於對安理會的改革持有不同聲音，有些作者對安理會的改革提出了幾種可能途徑。本文深入分析了這些可能變革，並自始至終把今天的國際秩序考慮在內，以及這種秩序以甚麼方式對錯綜複雜的變化施加影響。

Martins, Miguel Roque - O Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas: a questão da reforma.

Mais de meio século após a sua fundação, a Organização das Nações Unidas tem vindo a sofrer diversas pressões para a reforma do Conselho de Segurança, uma vez que a actual estrutura permanente, constituída pela Grã-Bretanha, China, França, Rússia e Estados Unidos, é vista como um anacronismo histórico e uma simples montra das potências vitoriosas da Segunda Guerra Mundial, não refletindo, desta forma, a presente ordem internacional, nem as Nações Unidas como instituição. Tendo em consideração as diversas vozes favoráveis à restruturação do Conselho de Segurança, diferentes autores enumeram formas possíveis para a citada reforma. Estas potenciais mudanças serão profundamente analisadas neste ensaio, tendo em conta a presente ordem internacional e a forma como esta ordem poderá influenciar o resultado de tão complexa metamorfose.